Glik v. Cunniffe
The First Circuit held that a private citizen openly recording police officers performing an arrest on the Boston Common was exercising a clearly established First Amendment right and that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him under Massachusetts’s wiretap law.
Executive Summary
Glik is a foundational federal appellate decision on the First Amendment right to record police. It is especially significant because the First Circuit did not merely recognize the right; it held that, on the facts alleged, the right was clearly established when Simon Glik was arrested in 2007.
Glik stood roughly ten feet from three Boston police officers who were arresting another man on the Boston Common. Concerned that the officers might be using excessive force, he openly recorded the encounter with his cell phone. After an officer asked whether the phone was recording audio and Glik said yes, officers arrested him under Massachusetts’s wiretap statute and other state-law offenses.
The charges were later dismissed. Glik then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the First and Fourth Amendments. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, holding that Glik was exercising clearly established First Amendment rights by recording police in a public place and that the arrest lacked probable cause because Massachusetts’s wiretap statute required a secret interception, while Glik’s recording was open and known to the officers.
A private citizen has a First Amendment right to record police officers performing their duties in public, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. On the facts alleged in Glik, that right was clearly established.
The Encounter
On the evening of October 1, 2007, Simon Glik was walking through the Boston Common when he saw three police officers arresting a young man. He heard another bystander say words to the effect of, “You are hurting him, stop.” Concerned that excessive force might be occurring, Glik stopped approximately ten feet away and began recording the arrest on his cell phone.
After the suspect had been handcuffed, one officer told Glik that he had taken enough pictures. Glik responded that he was recording and stated that he had seen an officer punch the suspect. An officer then asked whether Glik’s cell phone was recording audio. When Glik confirmed that it was, the officer placed him in handcuffs.
Police arrested Glik for violating Massachusetts’s wiretap statute, disturbing the peace, and aiding in the escape of a prisoner. His cell phone and a computer flash drive were seized during booking.
The aiding charge was voluntarily dismissed. The Boston Municipal Court later dismissed the remaining charges. As to the wiretap count, the court concluded there was no probable cause because the statute required a secret recording and Glik had openly recorded the officers. The disturbing-the-peace charge also failed because Glik’s conduct was peaceful and did not constitute the charged offense.
The factual setting matters: a traditional public forum, an openly visible recording device, approximately ten feet of separation, and no allegation that Glik physically obstructed or interfered with the officers’ arrest.
The First Amendment Analysis
The First Circuit framed the question narrowly: whether there is a constitutionally protected right to videotape police officers carrying out their duties in public. It answered that question affirmatively.
The court reasoned that the First Amendment protects more than the final act of speaking or publishing. It also protects conduct related to gathering and disseminating information. Recording public officials performing public duties fits within that protected information-gathering function.
Recording government activity serves public oversight
The court emphasized the public interest in obtaining information about government affairs and explained that police officers are government officials whose actions are legitimate subjects of public scrutiny. Recording their public conduct can contribute directly to discussion about governmental affairs.
The right belongs to citizens, not only journalists
The court rejected any meaningful constitutional distinction between professional media and ordinary citizens for this purpose. The First Amendment protects information gathering by members of the public, and modern technology allows ordinary citizens to record and disseminate government activity on a scale once associated primarily with institutional news organizations.
The location strengthened the claim
Glik was recording on the Boston Common, a traditional public forum. The court considered that location important because Glik was lawfully present in a public place while observing officers carrying out an arrest in public view.
The First Amendment protects the recording of government officials, including police officers, performing their duties in public. The protection is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions and does not create a right to interfere with legitimate police activity.
The Fourth Amendment and the Wiretap Arrest
The officers also argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity from Glik’s Fourth Amendment claim because they had at least arguable probable cause to arrest him under Massachusetts’s wiretap statute.
The First Circuit rejected that argument. Massachusetts law criminalized the secret interception of oral communications. The secrecy element was critical. Glik’s conduct, as alleged, was the opposite of secret: he stood nearby with the phone visible, openly recorded the officers, told them he was recording, and confirmed that the device was capturing audio.
Because the officers knew the recording was occurring, the court concluded that the essential secrecy element of the wiretap offense was absent. On those facts, the officers could not reasonably believe that probable cause existed for the wiretap arrest.
Glik does not establish a nationwide rule governing every state recording statute. Agencies must analyze the actual elements of their jurisdiction’s eavesdropping, interception, privacy, obstruction, and recording laws before using those statutes as an enforcement basis.
Qualified Immunity
The appeal reached the First Circuit on the officers’ claim of qualified immunity. The court therefore addressed not only whether Glik alleged constitutional violations, but whether the relevant rights were clearly established at the time of the 2007 arrest.
First Amendment right
The court concluded that existing First Circuit precedent, together with broader First Amendment principles and authority from other circuits, made the public right to record police sufficiently clear. A reasonable officer would have understood that arresting a peaceful bystander merely for openly recording an arrest in a public place implicated the First Amendment.
Fourth Amendment right
The court likewise held that the absence of probable cause was clear under Massachusetts law because the wiretap statute’s secrecy requirement had long been established and the officers knew Glik was openly recording them.
The First Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity on both the First Amendment and Fourth Amendment claims. The holding is fact-specific: it rests on the public setting, Glik’s peaceful conduct, the open nature of the recording, and the settled elements of the Massachusetts wiretap offense.
What Glik Does—and Does Not—Establish
- The case recognizes a right to record police performing public duties from a lawful public location; it does not create an unrestricted right to record anywhere.
- The court expressly acknowledged reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.
- The decision does not give a recorder authority to physically obstruct officers, cross a lawful perimeter, enter a restricted space, compromise an active operation, or interfere with an arrest.
- The Boston Common is a traditional public forum; recording inside a police station or other government facility requires a different forum and access analysis.
- The decision involved open recording. Later First Circuit cases separately address secret recording and the Massachusetts interception statute.
- The qualified-immunity holding is tied to the law and facts of the 2007 encounter and should not be generalized into a rule that qualified immunity automatically fails in every recording case.
- The Fourth Amendment portion depends on Massachusetts’s statutory requirement of secret interception and should not be transplanted mechanically to other states.
Agency Guidance
Primary Sources and Further Reading
This monograph is provided for training and general informational purposes. It is not legal advice and does not replace review of the complete opinion, current statutes, controlling federal and state authority, agency policy, or consultation with prosecutors and agency counsel.
© 2026 Shield Public Safety Training. All rights reserved. Reviewed September 7, 2026.

